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THESIS

**A COMPARISON OF THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY
POLICY IN COLOMBIA AND PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ**

by

James A. Walker

September 2009

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IN COLOMBIA AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ**

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ABSTRACT

The issue of security and democratic development in Colombia and Iraq are important for them as nations as well as for the international community.

For Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy is a mechanism to establish government presence throughout the country; reclaim territory and the population from insurgent, paramilitary, and other criminal groups; and so end practically 60 years of internal conflict. Colombia's chronic instability not only creates tensions in the country, but also in the region as well as the United States. The DSP is the latest in a long line of efforts to secure the country and its citizens from the grasp of Colombia's insurgent and criminal groups.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, imported into Iraq from Afghanistan, have adapted to a different Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction environment with difficulty. The lack of coordination and resources, as well as security threats, has severely limited their effectiveness.

This thesis seeks to examine the strengths and weaknesses of both the DSP in Colombia and the PRTs in Iraq to determine their effectiveness, as well as which methods, strategies, and practices might be transferable to other SSTR environments.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| AUC | United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CACO | Combined Action Company |
| CAG | Combined Action Group |
| CAP | Combined Action Program |
| CERP | Commanders Emergency Response Funding |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CNP | Colombian National Police |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| COLAR | Colombian Army |
| CORDS | Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program |
| CPA | Coalition Provisional Authority |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| DoS | Department of State |
| DSP | Democratic Security Policy |
| ELN | National Liberation Army |
| FARC | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia |
| FOB | Forward Operating Base |
| FS | Foreign Service |
| FSJ | Foreign Service Journal |
| GAO | Government Accounting Office |
| GOP | Government of Panama |
| GVN | Government of the Republic of Vietnam |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| ICITAP | International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program |
| MAF | Marine Amphibious Force |
| MAP | Military Assistance Program |

| | |
|----------|---|
| MNF-I | Multi National Force-Iraq |
| MOE | Measures of Effectiveness |
| MP | Military Police |
| MSG | Military Support Group |
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| OIF | Operation Iraqi Freedom |
| PATT | Planning, Advisory, and Training Team |
| PDF | Panamanian Defense Force |
| PF | Popular Forces |
| PNP | Panamanian National Police |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| PSD | Personal Security Detachment |
| PSDF | People's Self Defense Force |
| PST | Provincial Support Team |
| PSYOPS | Psychological Operations |
| QRF | Quick Reaction Funding |
| RF | Regular Forces |
| RMA | Revolution of Military Affairs |
| SSTR | Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction |
| SOUTHCOM | United States Southern Command |
| TO&E | Table of Organization and Equipment |
| UNHCR | The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USOC | U.S. Office on Colombia |
| VC | Viet Cong |

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RELEVANCE

The issue of security and democratic development in Colombia and Iraq are important for them as nations as well as for the international community.

For Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) is a mechanism to establish government presence throughout the country; reclaim territory and the population from insurgent, paramilitary, and other criminal groups; and so end practically 60 years of internal conflict. Colombia's chronic instability not only creates tension in the region, but also, because it is fed by crime, especially the drug trade, directly impacts the United States.

For its part, the success of the coalition effort in Iraq will secure a country in which the United States and its allies have invested significant blood, treasure, and political capital. The creation of a stable, friendly Iraq will help secure U.S. interests in an oil-rich region vital to the security of the world, and serve to counter balance radical tendencies in other countries by supplying the example of a stable, prosperous democracy.

B. THESIS

This thesis will examine, through a historical analysis, the effectiveness of and difference between the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq. This will be done in an effort to determine which one is more effective within its environment and what qualities make it so. The Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) will be applied to a number of categories. This exercise should indicate the best qualities of each approach and how they might be incorporated into the other's practices.

The numbers of assassinations, murders, and kidnappings in Colombia have decreased since the introduction of the DSP in 2002. However, some critics argue that the

stability that has undeniably been brought to war-torn Colombia has been purchased at the cost of significant human rights violations.¹

The policy has made a concerted effort to reach out to the people of Colombia and to the insurgent and paramilitary groups that have ruled much of the countryside since the 1960s. Demobilization, security, bolstering the judicial system, and re-establishing governmental control of roads and rural areas are the hallmarks of this policy. The effectiveness of some of these efforts is debatable, but the government of Colombia has successfully contributed to a stabilized Colombia in a short seven-year period, while dealing with significant internal problems.

The main mission of the PRT is “to promote progress in governance, security, and reconstruction.”² There are several factors that separate the PRTs from the DSP. First, PRTs are an external entity manned largely by foreign personnel that are being utilized to conduct stability and reconstruction operations (SSTR) in Iraq. In Colombia, the DSP is an indigenous entity being used to conduct SSTR operations. Even though PRTs are part of a foreign effort to stabilize Iraq, they have enjoyed a favorable reception from the population. Additionally, PRTs do not provide their own security and therefore must rely heavily on military forces for protection, which occasionally impedes progress. To assist in SSTR operations in areas where security is a concern, the Army has developed the ePRT, an element attached to a combat brigade, which allows the PRT to function in an insecure environment.³

C. OUTLINE

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I will be a brief overview of the DSP and PRTs and why the study of this topic is important. Chapter II will provide a historical background of the United States’ and Colombia’s interaction and cooperation in civil military action and their progression into what is called the Democratic Security

¹ Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Uribe Must Respect Judicial Independence,” report (October 2008), 1.

² Robert Perito, “Special Report 152: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” *United States Institute of Peace* (2005): 6.

³ GAO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO-09-86R,” (Washington, D.C.: 2008), 2.

Policy and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Chapter III will describe and analyze the Democratic Security Policy as well as the concerns of its critics. Chapter IV examines the Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Iraq and provides an analysis of the methods used by PRTs in Iraq and how effective their actions have been in building and sustaining stability and establishing democratic institutions. The Conclusion will provide a comparison between the DSP and PRTs and establish which one has been more effective in adapting to its post-conflict environment. And what “best practices” might be transported to other post-conflict situations.

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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL MILITARY ACTION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States and Colombia have long shared a friendly political relationship, which has translated into close economic and military ties. This chapter will trace the common origins of Colombia's DSP and the United States' PRTs and show how each evolved in order to meet their modern-day challenges.

A. EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY

The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP), in the wake of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, was focused away from Europe toward areas considered vulnerable to communist subversion. This program played midwife to *acción civica*, which has dominated the Colombian military's approach to counter-insurgency since the 1960s.⁴ *Acción civica* was a counter-insurgency program that modernized and professionalized Colombia's military following the civil war known as *La Violencia*, a decade-long conflict between Liberal and Conservative partisans. Founded in 1907, Colombia's professional Army initially reflected the German influence projected through the Chilean military mission. However, this changed in 1942, when Colombia declared war on the Axis. Though Colombia sent no troops to Europe, as did Brazil, it cooperated closely with Washington in the defense of the Panama Canal and the campaign against U-boats in the Caribbean. Colombia also contributed a battalion and a ship to the Korean War (1951-1953). Army officers returning from that war standardized a U.S. staff structure and TO&E in the Colombian army, and opened the *Escuela militar des Lanceros*, based on the U.S. Army Ranger School. In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year plan to aid the economic development of Latin America. The Alliance for Progress was a program developed to build and strengthen economic ties between the United States and South America.

⁴ Robert M. Stein, Mark Ishimatsu and Richard J. Stoll, "The Fiscal Impact of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, 1967-1976," *The Western Political Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (1985): 29.

General Álvaro Valencia Tovar insists that the transfer of ideas was not a one-way street. In 1959, an assessment team from the United States Department of State and the CIA visited Colombia to help fashion a military response to the lingering effects of *La Violencia*. “I was battalion commander in Caldas where Liberal municipalities in west were at war with Conservatives,”⁵ he remembered. “This is where I invented civic action. I worked with the priests, who were mostly conservatives, but understood the need for reconciliation. A major from the U.S. military mission came by in 1959 (and this brought the ideas to the States). There were no books on this, so I had to use my imagination. We had no experience.” One outcome of the U.S. missions was Plan Lazo, a June 1962 Embassy-generated plan that was meant to unite the fragmented planning, coordination and intelligence efforts of the Colombian army, and to combine political, economic and social aspects into a unified counter-insurgency strategy.⁶ “Plan Lazo was devised to force government agencies to participate in civic action to attract the peasants and gather intelligence,” General Valencia insisted. “The requirement for combat intelligence was a lesson from Korea.”⁷

Subsequent advisory teams imported notions of civic and psychological action that had become fashionable under President John F. Kennedy, for whom the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is named.⁸

These ideas found fertile soil for at least three reasons: First, the notion that the Colombian military should play a role in the economic and social development of the country dated at least from the 1930s. “The reigning impression in officialdom,” wrote future army commander Álvaro Valencia of this period, “was that the army was a superfluous institution in a country whose borders were settled. The military understood

⁵ Douglas Porch, interview with General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, Bogotá, 11 March 2008. I thank Professor Porch for permission to use this interview.

⁶ Charles H. Briscoe, “Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2 vol. 2, no. 4, (2006): 38-46

⁷ Porch, interview with General Valencia.

⁸ Kenneth Finlayson, “Colombia: A Special Relationship,” *Veritas. Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2 vol. 2, no. 4 (2006): 5-7.

that it had to leave its barracks to undertake national projects that justified its costs.”⁹ So, the army needed a mission, which was virtually foisted upon it in 1958, when Liberal Party President Alberto Lleras, to pre-empt *coups* by conservative malcontents, told officers of the Bogotá garrison gathered in the *Teatro Patria* that politicians would concede the quasi-autonomy of the military so long as they abstained from politics. In the long run, this separation of military and civilian functions proved baleful, because it became difficult to orchestrate a successful counter-insurgency strategy when the politicians saw security as an exclusively military problem.

The DSP may be seen as the latest attempt to reverse what is called the “Lleras doctrine”—the autonomy of separate military and political realms. But in the short term, Lleras’ challenge was snapped up by officers, mainly Liberals who had been exiled to Korea to give Conservatives a free hand to deal with *La Violencia*. Their interaction with U.S. forces had showcased the abysmal professional standards of a Colombian army whose idea of counter-insurgency strategy was to displace or massacre populations thought sympathetic to the guerrilla. They saw counter-insurgency, carried out in a framework of gringo doctrines that the Colombians called variously *acción cívica*, *acción sociológica*, or *acción integral*, as a way to modernize and professionalize the Colombian armed forces, and burnish a military image tarnished by the brutish excesses of *La Violencia*. They also saw *acción cívica* as an internal “civilizing mission,” a way to use the military to moralize a country in which many of its citizens were brutalized by poverty, lacked hope, and hence had no stake in the future. “When I was commander of the fifth brigade, I paid lots of attention to civic action,” continued General Valencia. “I showed the mayor what we called the ‘seven black zones’ in Buccaramanga—seven zones of misery. I flew over Buccaramanga in a helicopter with him. We made a joint effort. He gave me land. We built a ‘transitional zone.’ The Peace Corps helped, and lived in the area. [The army] taught the people building techniques. *We had to teach them to be owners, to be better people* (emphasis added).”¹⁰

⁹ Álvaro Valencia Tovar, *Testimonio de una época. Años signados por el conflicto en el que han vivido inmersos el Estado y la sociedad colombiana bajo el rotulo de la violencia*. (Bogotá: Planeta, 1992), 72.

¹⁰ Porch, interview with General Valencia.

But these local successes were seldom repeated on a national scale, for several reasons. First, of course, was the “Lleras Doctrine,” which basically allowed politicians to wash their hands of impoverished, remote rural areas where there were few votes to be garnered in any case. A second problem was both a lack of resources in a developing country and interest groups resistant to change. Liberals generally argued that the lack of land was the fundamental cause of violence in Colombia. However, land reform ran up against the heated opposition of the large landowners who insisted that agriculture was profitable only with large exploitations. In 1958, the *Instituto de Reforma Agraria - Incora* was created to redistribute land. Over time, it did have some success in marginal areas. But it failed to prove the dynamo of social change that its founders had hoped.¹¹ In 1985, President Belisario Betancur launched a *Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación* to provide resources to integrate demobilizing guerrillas. It failed in its primary mission for a variety of reasons, the principle one being underfunding.¹² But those monies that were allocated set off squabbles among politicians that the party in power was directing development funds to its areas of influence to exercise political patronage.

A third problem was that *acción cívica* was not popular among politicians because they believed that it enticed the military into the civil realm, in contravention of the Lleras Doctrine, and politicized them. The first major advocate of *acción cívica* in Colombia was chief of the army from 1961 and subsequently War Minister, General Alberto Ruiz Nova. Son of a prominent Liberal family who had commanded the Colombia Battalion in Korea, Ruiz transformed the armed forces into a civic action machine.¹³ Ruiz took his enthusiasm for *acción integral* beyond the limit of political prudence when, in 1964, he stood up in a public meeting and, in the presence of the President of the Republic, blasted politicians for not doing enough for the economic and

¹¹ Guillermo de la Peña, “Rural Mobilizations in Latin America since c 1920,” in *Latin American Politics and Society*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 358-61.

¹² There was serious military opposition to demobilization. Also, the attack on the *Palais de Justicia* by the guerrilla group M-19 in 1985, in which all but one supreme court justice was killed, as well as numerous civilians and guerrillas, removed any incentive to lavish government largess on guerrillas. The PNR eventually evolved into a crop substitution program. Republica de Colombia. Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, Documento CONPES 2734-DNP-UDA-UJS, Bogotá, 12 October 1994, http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/Legislacion_tematica/DR-DesarrolloAlternativo%20Conpes_1994.pdf.

¹³ See *Memoria de Ministro de Guerra al Congreso*, for 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

social development of Colombia and advocated land redistribution.¹⁴ President Guillermo León Valencia Muñoz probably suspected—correctly, no doubt—that Ruiz was promoting *acción integral* as a platform to mount a political campaign to succeed him, and ended his military career. A decade later, Valencia Tovar was fired as chief of the army after he locked horns with President Alfonso López Michelsen over a budget to coordinate army and civil ministry efforts to undertake more civic action projects.¹⁵ As a result of this refusal to combine civil and military efforts to nation build in Colombia, the efforts there were piecemeal, disjointed, underfunded and, ultimately, militarized. In the hands of the army, *acción civil* was transformed into an intelligence gathering enterprise, a way to inventory the population and monitor their resources to make sure that they were not going to the insurgency, finding interlocutors, and identifying guerrillas and their supporters.

From the 1980s, Colombia's security problems exploded as illegal drugs fueled the growth and violence of criminal cartels and insurgent groups, in particular, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or FARC. Andrés Pastrana's 1998 election as president can be attributed to his promise to negotiate peace with the insurgent groups.¹⁶ Although peace negotiations with the FARC were ultimately unsuccessful, they bought time and created a favorable political climate to allow for President Pastrana to negotiate *Plan Colombia*. *Plan Colombia* was a six-year, \$7.5 billion, U.S.-funded, plan that would allow for the expansion and modernization of the Colombian armed forces and police.

President Pastrana's plan was to hold peace talks with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). To demonstrate sincerity, Pastrana formed a demilitarized zone called the "*despeje*", meaning "clear" or "open." Here the FARC and the government of Colombia could have "breathing space." Cessation of hostilities in the

¹⁴ Valencia Tovar, *Testimonio*, 432-434.

¹⁵ Porch, interview with General Valencia.

¹⁶ Robert W. Jones, "Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota: The Evolution of Colombia's National Strategy," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2, vol. 2, no. 4 (2006): 61.

despeje would ostensibly allow all sides to come to the negotiating table to discuss peace and ultimately bring an end to conflict in Colombia.¹⁷

Even though President Pastrana hoped that these concessions towards the FARC would allow for the initiation of peace, the FARC used the *despeje* to “rest, refit, and build strength without the Colombian armed forces or police disrupting its activities.”¹⁸ In 2001, Pastrana broke off negotiations with the FARC. The following year, Alvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia.

Uribe inherited two advantages from his predecessor: a popular realization that the FARC was a criminal organization with no real interest in suspending its insurgency, and a U.S.-supported plan to increase and modernize the capabilities of the Colombian military and Colombian National Police. To combat the insurgents, Uribe established an offensive plan to increase security and eradicate the insurgent groups in Colombia, known as *Plan Patriota*.

Plan Patriota was a two-part campaign plan to protect the population, reclaim territory, and combat insurgents. The first phase would have the Colombian Forces attack certain FARC-controlled areas in an attempt to reclaim the territory. The second phase of *Plan Patriota* called for the CNP to immediately reoccupy the reclaimed territory and to provide law and order. This permitted the government to re-establish services to the area and allow the population to return.

B. EVOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction operations conducted by the United States in the past provide a wealth of historical knowledge upon which to base current operations. But following the loss of Vietnam, U.S. forces turned their backs on even the successful programs like Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, in the belief that the U.S. public would not support a slow, patient strategy of nation building. Instead, the Pentagon sought to implement a

¹⁷ Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 61.

¹⁸ Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 61.

“Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a conventional force capable of defeating a “peer competitor.” Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces lapsed into training for stealth raids.

1. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program

While the progression of Colombia’s DSP has a fairly linear trajectory, the PRTs have a more tortuous provenance. The very Military Assistance Program teams that converted Colombian forces (or who were converted by them if Valencia Tovar is to be believed) into fervent missionaries of “civic action,” became the progenitors in 1967 of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, a combined civil-military advisory, pacification, and civil affairs effort in Vietnam. Many argue that Iraq’s PRTs are the direct descendants of CORDS. Others insist that there are significant differences.¹⁹

“The CORDS organization paralleled the military and political structure of South Vietnamese Government, with a deputy for CORDS under each U.S. corps area commander and lower-ranking CORDS deputies at province and district headquarters,” writes Cosmos and Murray.²⁰ The PRTs in Iraq lack such a well-defined command structure, which, some argue, has had a detrimental effect on the overall effectiveness of the program. In Vietnam, the CORDS in 1970 were under the direct control of the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon.²¹ This gave CORDS a direct link to the senior in country U.S. representative, which meant that all leaders of the pacification effort in Vietnam answered to one person. In Iraq, it is difficult to determine who is in charge and to whom one answers given the myriad of government and military structures. However, if the CORDS and PRTs have a different structure at the top, their work on the ground is similar. Like the PRTs, CORDS utilized the “military region and province councils,

¹⁹ PHK, “Iraq is not Vietnam and PRTs are not CORDS,” *Whirled View*, 7 November, 2007, <http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2007/11/iraq-is-not-vie.html>.

²⁰ Graham A. Cosmas and Lieutenant Colonel Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, ed. Major William R. Melton, USMC, and Jack Shulison (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 128.

²¹ Ibid.

working closely with their counterpart CORDS organizations (that) over-saw implementation of the national plans at the lower levels of government.”²²

2. Combined Action Program

The USMC Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam is another close relative of the PRTs. Created in 1965, the program increased in size through 1966, as Combined Action Companies (CACO) were created along with Combined Actions Groups (CAG). The CAP program was subordinate to the CACO and the CAG, which created a fairly linear command structure.

In January 1970, the four CAGs consisted of a total of 42 Marine officers and 2,050 enlisted men, with two naval officers and 126 hospital corpsman. Organized in 20 CACOs and 114 CAPs, these Americans worked with about 3,000 RF [Regional Force] and PF [Popular Force] soldiers. The 2d CAG in Quang Nam, largest of the four, consisted of eight CACOs with 36 CAPs and almost 700 Marine and Navy officers and men, while the smallest, the 4th in Quang Tri, had three CACOs and 18 CAPs.²³

The CAP program was born in 1965, “when III MAF, in trying to secure the heavily populated area around Hue/Phu Bai, discovered a potential ally in the then disparaged and neglected popular forces.”²⁴ The CAP program placed a “15-man Marine rifle squad paired with a 15- to 30-man PF platoon to defend one particular village.”²⁵ The platoons of Marines were placed in villages and hamlets throughout the country, to gain the trust of the local villagers and to protect them from Viet Cong (VC) Communist forces. Hamlets are similar to villages but are smaller. The Marines living in the villages and hamlets, among the population, were able to build trust with villagers, which allowed the villagers to give information about members of the village sympathetic to or active in the VC. This trust combined with protection from the Marines forged a bond between the villagers and the Marines that staunch VC infiltration and influence in the small

²² Cosmas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 129.

²³ Ibid., 139.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

hamlets. Unlike “search and destroy” missions that passed through areas like a storm before moving on, the CAP program left Marines in the villages even after firefights in order to provide a continued protection of the villagers from VC forces.

This program was not without its drawbacks, however. The major concern with the CAP program was that Marines would be placed in villages and hamlets that had already been infiltrated by the VC. This made the Marines extremely vulnerable once they initially entered the hamlet or village area or until they were able to gain the trust of the villagers. Even with the trust of villagers, the fear that they were supporting VC infiltrated villages was a constant concern. Although CORDS and CAP had identical goals, they remained separate efforts until the end of the U.S. presence in Vietnam due to a lack of collaboration between the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam overshadowed some bright spots of the campaign. While partisans of CORDS and CAP claimed success in Vietnam, even they were forced to admit that it was too little, too late, with inadequate funding and participation. Others, like Harry Summers, a Vietnam conflict expert, saw these SSTR efforts as a distraction from the main forces, which was the Viet Cong!²⁶

Defeat in Vietnam soured many soldiers, government officials, and defense experts on counter-insurgency, which was seen as an approach too slow, too indecisive, and incapable of producing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) required to secure public support for a war over the long haul. After a demoralizing decade of the 1970s, the United States military became fixated on what was eventually categorized as the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” a search for a high technology military machine capable of overwhelming opponents with “shock and awe,” or deter them from even thinking about going to war with America. Quick, decisive victory, it was hoped, would take public opinion out of strategy calculation. The high priests of RMA were half right—they did create a force capable of achieving rapid success and proved its lethality in the 1989 invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, but failed to adequately consider post-conflict SSTR operations.

²⁶ Harry G. Summers, *A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 175-177.

3. Military Support Groups

Following Vietnam, the United States again tried its hand in stability and reconstruction operations in Panama, but on a much smaller scale than that of Vietnam and Iraq. During Operation Just Cause, the overwhelming, superiority of the U.S. military swiftly defeated Manuel Noriega's Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), which created a power vacuum leaving Colón and Panama City virtually lawless. Following the combat arm of Operation Just Cause, the stability and reconstruction phase, Operation Promote Liberty was initiated. Since little thought was given to stability and reconstruction operations following the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. military, like so many times in its history, improvised an organization in order to fill the void of lackluster post-conflict planning. To accomplish this, Military Support Groups (MSG) were created. MSGs were used, primarily because NGOs were not included in the combat and post hostilities planning and therefore were neither ready, nor prepared to deploy humanitarian services to the battered areas of Panama.

Prior to the end of hostilities in Panama, there was not a clearly defined command structure for stability and reconstruction operations. This issue was not solved until the official end of hostilities. After Operation Just Cause ended, "the MSG was then placed under Joint Task Force Panama headed by Major General Cisneros."²⁷ Being placed under the JTFP gave the MSG a definitive command structure (See Figure 1). Jim Steele was selected to command the MSG because he spoke fluent Spanish, had extensive Latin America and civil military experience, and for his reputation for success.²⁸

Under Colonel Steele, the MSG staff contained approximately 40 personnel, and the actual MSG groups varied in size depending on the mission they were to conduct.²⁹ During Promote Liberty, Colonel Steele's stability and reconstruction efforts commenced; however, his task was made extremely difficult because there was no

²⁷ William Conley, "Operations 'Just Cause' and 'Promote Liberty': The Implications of Military Operations Other Than War" (Master's thesis, Command and Staff College, 2001), 25.

²⁸ Richard H. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1993), 35.

²⁹ Ibid.

political advisor or ambassador on scene.³⁰ The lack of political authority led to long wait times for decisions to be made during stability and reconstruction operations. This issue was remedied when Ambassador Dean Hinton arrived in Panama, which allowed Colonel Steele to attribute more time to stability and reconstruction operations.




Figure 1. MSG Command Structure.³¹

A U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division was used extensively to assist the population in the reconstruction effort. CA teams “employed engineers and medical personnel to support infrastructure reconstruction and nation building projects.”³² These teams were instrumental in the reconstruction process, since there was minimal interagency coordination.

The 101st Airborne and Military Police were forced to take over law enforcement and peacekeeping actions due to the collapse of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and because the State Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) officials were not able to take over training and support for the newly formed Panamanian National Police (PNP) Force. The MSG used military reservists who were police officers in the United States to aid in training the PNP. Overall, there were about 300 MP’s training and escorting the PNP on patrols throughout

³⁰ Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, “Panama: Operation Just Cause,” in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operation and Public Security*, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 7.

³¹ Conley, “Operations ‘Just Cause,’” 25.

³² Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 35.

the city.³³ In addition to MP's and CA teams working under the MSG to help the population, the MSG also employed the 4th Psychological Operations Group.

The job of the 4th Psychological Operations Group was to “conduct positive PSYOPS missions; enhance the prestige of the Government of Panama (GOP) among the Panamanian people; assist in turning the police into a motivated, effective, professional force, respectful of human rights, dedicated to law and order, and subordinated to civilian democratic control; and boost popular support for the police.”³⁴

The work of MSGs in Panama was considered successful due in part to the close relationships the military created with the Panamanian Government and the citizens. Much like the CAP program in Vietnam, members of the MSG built close ties with the Panamanian citizens and with the government, which allowed for an effective and swift removal of radical elements of the PDF and restoration of services to the people of Panama. Panama should have been a warning for future SSTR operations conducted by the United States. Operation Desert Storm was a swift, decisive victory for the U.S.-led coalition, which resulted in limited SSTR operations and even less planning. It was this mindset by the military planners that contributed to the fact that little or no post conflict planning occurred before the invasion of Iraq. Operation Promote Liberty was the last significant effort attempted by the United States to provide teams, whose sole use and mission was to conduct stability and reconstruction operations until the creation of PRTs following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghanistan)

In 2001, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were officially established in Afghanistan by the United States. Their mission was to provide training and assistance to the local government, allowing them to participate in their government. Initially, PRTs in Afghanistan were successful in accomplishing their mission. Their success could be attributed to the lack of an active insurgency like that found in Iraq. Nonetheless, they were exported to Iraq in 2005.

³³ Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 38.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

5. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Iraq)

Once again, in 2003, the U.S. military used overwhelming force to dispose Saddam Hussein and his corrupt, murderous regime. Unfortunately, the fall of Saddam was followed by mismanagement, chaos, and insurgency. The United States was forced to reach back across the chasm of the post-Vietnam decades to resurrect an earlier experiment. In 2003, a program similar to CORDS was created by the United States called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Initially, PRTs were employed in Afghanistan, and, because of their success there, they were exported to Iraq in late 2005. In Iraq, the PRTs initially faced a myriad of challenges, from security to participation and funding. Given the relative success of PRTs in Afghanistan and the lessons learned from pacification efforts in Vietnam, one wonders why it took so long for PRTs to be established in Iraq.

C. DIFFERENT APPROACHES

While PRTs in Iraq face many of the same issues as the DSP in Colombia, the two approach their problems differently. This is to be expected: Colombia has an internal conflict on its own soil, while the United States is attempting to bring order to a society far different in language and culture than its own. The different approaches also reflect national experiences, values, and resources. The nature of the enemy is different, which also determines the adaptation. Colombia's weak democratic system has historically had its hands full dealing with the strength and freedom of movement of terrorist and paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the now demobilized United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC), all of which employ violence, kidnapping, and assassinations in order to gain political power and weaken democratic institutions of the state. The violent attacks and/or intimidation carried out by these groups against the civilian population and the country's inability to protect its citizens has prevented many civilians from participating in the political process, or even to achieve a modicum of prosperity outside of criminal systems.

The FARC, ELN, AUC, and its lineal descendents known as *Bacrim*es (*Bandes Criminales Emergentes*), have enjoyed relative immunity from their crimes because of a confused and poorly organized demobilization process, a dysfunctional judicial system, and the Justice and Peace Law, which allowed for the minimal punishment of former AUC members who confessed their crimes. One of the goals of the DSP is to establish a fully functional Anglo-Saxon-style adversarial judicial system. The government is walking a thin line while trying to regain control of its country, defeat and demobilize terrorists groups without undermining the human rights of its citizens.

PRTs in Iraq, similar to that of Colombia's *acción cívica* approach, are facing a strong insurgency that has prevented the establishment of democratic institutions and prosperity in the economically battered country. Iraq's dictatorship fell quickly during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), but there was insufficient planning to establish a government that was able to provide services to the people of Iraq, beginning with security. Additionally, no one anticipated or planned to counter the insurgency that emerged even before combat operations had "officially" ceased on May 3, 2003. PRTs were behind the power curve from the beginning in Iraq because they were not established until two years after hostilities commenced, and when they had arrived in country, Iraq had become too dangerous for them to operate effectively. Much like Colombia, the Iraqi judicial system was inoperable and the insurgents were threatening the population because U.S. forces were unable to provide adequate protection. The military also provided security for PRTs, which limited their effectiveness until a solid security curtain was established following the surge of 2006-2007.

The struggle for democracy and stability in Colombia and Iraq will continue to be problematic. The resilience of insurgent and terrorists groups within each country poses a significant threat to the overall effectiveness of each program and to the mission being conducted in each. The insurgent groups in Colombia, especially the FARC, though reduced in strength, threaten government control in many areas of the country.

In Iraq, U.S. forces worked diligently to secure the country in order for SSTR operations to occur. The significant economic and social turmoil that followed in the wake of OIF left PRTs at a disadvantage. As the setbacks, as well as achievements,

mounted in each campaign, each has responded differently to ever-changing situations. Ultimately, however, DSP and PRTs have a core mission to become an effective instrument of stability in these countries. The way each of these programs responds to continued adversity will determine just how effective each has become within its respective environment.

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III. DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY

The focus of this chapter describes the development and implementation of the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia. The DSP has been successful in reclaiming much territory for the government. Nevertheless, other criminal groups remain active and well funded, principally through their participation in the illicit drug trade. In addition, certain programs under the DSP, such as Justice and Peace Law, stand accused of sacrificing justice and human rights in the name of security. Over the past six decades, Colombia has been engulfed by insurgents, and since the 1980s, paramilitary violence. The DSP appears to be the first effort that has made progress in regaining control of Colombian territory and its population.

A. INTERNAL CONFLICT

The DSP is a concept developed by President Uribe to restore the rule of law and peace throughout Colombia while trying to demobilize insurgent and paramilitary groups, reassert government control, and protect the population. Many citizens of Colombia have given up on the hope for a peaceful Colombia due to decades of internal conflict.

B. SECURITY

Colombia possesses a multifaceted, resilient insurgency that has wreaked havoc, especially since the 1980s. The inability of the Colombian government to control much of its territory and protect the population resulted in insurgent and/or paramilitary control of significant areas of Colombia. Under the DSP, President Uribe increased the number of military and police forces in an attempt to re-establish territorial control to protect and regain the support of the population, many of whom have lived under the rule of the FARC, ELN, or AUC for several generations. The increase in the numbers and proficiency of Colombian security forces has allowed for a three-pronged strategy: the first has been the creation of a network of “collaborators and informants who are paid to provide information about the insurgents.”³⁵ Secondly, he created a “semi-trained

³⁵ International Crisis Group, “Colombia; President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, Executive Summary and Recommendations,” *Latin America Report* (13 November 2003), 1.

peasant militia force whose members operate in their own home communities.”³⁶ These groups are known as “*soldatos de mi pueblo*,” or Home Guard. Lastly, an executive decree that was passed “grants the military a range of police powers with neither judicial approval nor oversight.”³⁷ These methods to enhance security within the country have come under fire for limiting the human rights of the Colombian citizens by giving the military far too much power over them in combat zones. On the other hand, a humanitarian crisis has occurred in areas where illegal armed groups intimidate and displace the population.

1. Insurgent and Paramilitary Issues

“Colombia is a classic case of guerilla organizations that are able to capture enough resources to support the growth of their military forces,” write RAND specialists in counter-terrorism Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa.³⁸ Weak government presence in many areas of the country allowed many guerilla forces to consolidate. The FARC, which emerged in the 1960s, is a quasi-Marxist organization. In one form or another, the government has been responsible for the creation of these groups. The AUC coalesced in the 1990s as a confederacy of local paramilitary or “self-defense” organizations allegedly to counter the surge of Marxist insurgencies. All three of these groups have been declared terrorists by the United States and the European Union.³⁹

a. *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)*

The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, better known as the FARC, is a heavily armed group of guerillas that uses the illegal drug trade, kidnappings, and other illegal activities to finance their political and military agenda. “The FARC is potentially the world’s richest and best funded insurgent group with a yearly income of

³⁶ International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 1.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Chalk and Rabasa, *Colombia Labyrinth*, 32.

³⁹ Troy J. Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency: Colombia’s Main Opposition Groups,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2, vol. 2, no. 4 (2006) 50.

more than one billion U.S. dollars,” writes Army historian Troy Saquety.⁴⁰ Although the FARC is the most powerful insurgent group in Colombia, its popular support is minimal, due largely to its ruthless use of violence and intimidation.⁴¹ Even with little support, the FARC maintains strongholds in areas in the north and south of the country, as shown in Figure 2. Until 2005, the government had not successfully countered the FARC and did not have to the capability to track them in the treacherous terrain in which they hid.



Figure 2. FARC Zones of Influence.⁴²

b. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

The *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, better known as the ELN, is a Marxist-inspired group that formed in the mid-1960s inspired and initially funded by Castro.⁴³ The group is the second-largest left-wing insurgency in Colombia, after the

⁴⁰ Saquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 47.

⁴¹ Chalk and Rabasa, *Colombia Labyrinth*, 29.

⁴² Spiegel Online International Services, Spiegel Interview with Ingrid Betancourt’s Son, “My Mother is Fading,” December 10 2007. Spiegel Online International Services, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,522443,00.html>.

⁴³ Saquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 49.

FARC, but historically does not rely so heavily on the illicit drug trade for funding, rather preferring extortion, kidnapping, and paid ransoms. They have typically operated in the areas close to oil pipelines and oil wells in the east along the border with Venezuela.⁴⁴ While they have occasionally been known to cooperate with the FARC against government forces and the AUC, they also compete with the FARC for the control of resources.

c. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)

The paramilitary group *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, AUC, was officially created in 1997 out of various groups that had emerged spontaneously since the 1980s. “The AUC’s stated purpose is to provide regional protection from Marxists insurgents.”⁴⁵ The formation of the AUC came about allegedly in response to the violent actions committed by the FARC, although many of its members were simply gangsters. Under the DSP, the government has been able to demobilize the AUC, reclaim a large portion of its territory, and provide a blanket of protection in areas that have not seen a government presence in years. For this reason, “the AUC declared that the government was putting enough pressure on the FARC and ELN that its presence was no longer needed.”⁴⁶ Due to the massive government undertaking, the AUC laid down its arms and disbanded between 2003 and 2006. Officially, the AUC has claimed to disarm and demobilize, but some radical elements within the organization have refused to disarm while others have simply transformed themselves into mafias known as *bacrim*s that now even cooperate with guerillas to shift illegal drugs.

2. Counter Insurgency Operations

There has been an active Counter Insurgency (COIN) operation in some form or fashion since the 1960s. COIN operations in Colombia have been, up until the development of the DSP, weak and ineffective as the government tries to regain control of insurgent and paramilitary held territory. To further complicate COIN operations,

⁴⁴ Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 49.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 50.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Colombia is a huge and largely roadless country.⁴⁷ The United States' assistance in bolstering Colombia's helicopter fleet has increased air mobility that has allowed the Colombian military and police to target once inaccessible guerilla strongholds. President Uribe has placed emphasis on properly funding government forces, to include the Colombian National Police (CNP), in order to regain control of Colombia and have the assets to combat the insurgent and paramilitary forces.

a. *Plan Patriota*

Plan Patriota is the Colombian counterpart of Plan Colombia, a phased plan created under the DSP that would protect the population, reclaim territory, and combat insurgents. According to James Brittain, "U.S. and Colombian militaries moved away from the façade of a war on drugs and directly into a counterterrorism campaign called *Plan Patriota*."⁴⁸ Under *Plan Patriota*, insurgent-held territory was divided into a grid system. The system was used to develop intelligence of FARC activities and movements. This has permitted the government and military to chose what kind of unit would be used to combat the different elements of the FARC. The first phase of *Plan Patriota* would have the Colombian Special Forces attack certain FARC-controlled areas and secure them. "As part of this operation, the Colombian units conduct extensive civic action and psychological operations to demonstrate the capacity of the government to look after the people."⁴⁹

The second phase of this operation calls for the CNP to fill the gap left by the FARC and provide law and order in the reclaimed area. To accomplish this, "they build fortified police stations in case of guerilla counterattack and to actively establish their presence."⁵⁰ The CNP units are basically there to provide a government presence for the population in order for them to feel more secure with the removal of the FARC and to

⁴⁷Jones, "Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota," 62.

⁴⁸ James J. Brittain, "The Objective Reality of Plan Patriota: A Response to Subjective Propaganda," *Colombia Journal* (January 24 2005): 1.

⁴⁹ Jones, "Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota," 64.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

provide protection from FARC retaliation. This is an extremely important element in this operation. This is the first significant interaction of government forces with the population in many areas where trust in the government must be created.

The third phase is implemented only after the area has been secure. At this point, “additional assets, primarily public services, are added in order to consolidate the government control of the area.”⁵¹ This plan is used to reclaim territory and , arguably the most important part of this operation, to protect the population. The protection of the population is seen as an essential task under the DSP.

b. Protecting the Population

There are many efforts used by the Uribe administration to fight the insurgent and paramilitary organizations while protecting the population. One of these efforts was the *soldatos de mi pueblo*, previously known as the *Sodatos campesinos* or peasant soldiers.

Originally, the peasant soldiers were meant to serve as municipal guards during the day and go home at night. But after they were declared military targets by the FARC and ELN and following a number of attacks on them, most are now stationed in small, newly-built military bases in the villages.⁵²

The *soldatos de mi pueblo* is a program where conscripts are allowed to serve in their own village or town. This has increased the protection of the people because the members of the *soldatos de mi pueblo* are familiar with the members of their community, so it is more difficult for the insurgents and paramilitary groups to operate within these areas. In 2003, there were approximately 15,228 *soldatos de mi pueblo*.⁵³ The use of the *soldatos de mi pueblo* combined with additional police “has permitted most mayors to return to their municipalities, after having been under threat of the FARC since mid-2002.”⁵⁴ This

⁵¹ Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 64.

⁵² International Crisis Group, “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” *Latin America Report* (13 November 2003), 4.

⁵³ International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 4.

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 8.

is a novel approach to counter-insurgency—a militia known as “People’s Self Defense Force,” was used in Vietnam under the umbrella of CORDS.

Many American officials considered the PSDF potentially one of the GVN [Government of Vietnam] most promising pacification devices, more for its mass involvement of people in supporting the government than for its still unproven military value.⁵⁵

The close-knit community in which the Vietnamese lived allowed them to identify communist forces, and now as a member of the PSDF, to take action against these forces.

The use of the *soldados de mi pueblo* was not the only effort made to curb violence and protect the Colombian population. By 2005, under Uribe the Colombian military had increased from 158,000 to 207,000 active duty personnel, while the CNP ballooned from 97,000 to 121,000 members.⁵⁶ The increase in the number and power of the police forces is significant because this is the first time in the country’s history that the CNP has been able to provide a police presence in all 1,098 municipalities in Colombia.⁵⁷ With the increased presence, there has been a decrease in violence countrywide and far fewer attacks on the country’s infrastructure.

Furthermore, there has been a significant reorganization of the military in order to make it more mobile and able to combat the FARC, in the mountainous FARC-controlled territory. Realizing the restraints on the Colombian military, the government reached an agreement with the U.S. Army to purchase a total of 60 Blackhawk and Huey helicopters, which has allowed for the formation of the mobile brigade and the replacement of many conscripts with professional soldiers.

The Colombian military and CNP have taken an approach much like that of the U.S. Marine-based, Vietnam era, Combined Action Program (CAP). In this program, a small number of U.S. Marines would live alongside the natives in their villages in Vietnam in order to protect the villagers and to build their trust and confidence in U.S. forces. Basically, the villagers and Marines cooperated in defense of the village and its

⁵⁵ Cosmas and Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 131.

⁵⁶ Garry Leech, “The Successes and Failures of President Uribe,” *Colombia Journal* (28 November 2005), 2.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

people. One example of this is in village of *La Unión Peneya*. *La Unión Peneya* was a village that was all but destroyed in 2002, when the Colombian military and elements of the FARC battled throughout the village.⁵⁸ Due to the intense fighting, the villagers were displaced and re-established themselves elsewhere. For more than three years, the village lay in ruin but protected by government forces. It was not until January 2007 that the villagers began to make their way home with government encouragement.⁵⁹ The military remained in the town to protect the returning refugees. They did this to show the villagers that they could depend on the government to protect them from the FARC. Fortunately for the villagers, the government forces protecting the village have been able to thwart three attempted attacks on the village.⁶⁰ With protection provided by the military, the governor of *La Unión Peneya* has been able to return to the village, providing the village a legitimate form of government apart from the FARC. Operations like this are being conducted across Colombia but still receive fierce resistance from the FARC in many locations, especially those located in “strategic corridors” along which the FARC moves arms, troops, and drugs.

3. Judicial System

The judicial system in Colombia has been plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and violence toward elected officials. One of the goals of the DSP is to create a fully functional judicial system—a lofty goal, considering the amount of corruption that existed and still exists. Due to the past five decades of violence, the government and judicial system have suffered many assassinations and kidnappings that have damaged the judicial system and intimidated judges and lawyers. To further complicate matters, guerilla forces such as the FARC and ELN, were able to infiltrate local and regional government offices and judicial systems throughout the country. The violence against members of the judicial system has increased to an extent that the United States has stepped in and assisted the Colombian Department of Interior in training and

⁵⁸ LTC Patrick J. Christian, “Building Capacity – Interagency & Intergovernmental CCAI Teams in Southern Colombia,” U.S. Army Special Forces, US MLGRP-Colombia PATT Station-Florencia (6th Division, COLAR), 2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 5.

protecting them. According to the U.S. State Department, “We have launched a program to protect threatened members of the judiciary in Colombia through temporary relocation and training in a third country.”⁶¹ Colombia’s Justice Department and the U.S. State Department are working together to protect many offices and officials in Colombia.

Working with the Colombian Ministry of Interior, the U.S. has provided protection assistance to 2,068 people and 36 offices under threat. The protection program includes threatened human rights workers, union leaders, journalists, and members of the left wing Patriotic Union Party. In 2002, it was expanded to include mayors, city council members and municipal human rights workers after the FARC started to systematically threaten them.⁶²

The FARC has been able to reach almost everyone in Colombia, and even the highest officials are not exempt from the threats of kidnapping, murder, and violence. If the government is not able to protect its elected officials and members of its judicial system, one wonders how it will be able to defeat a highly trained and well-funded organization such as the FARC. The DSP is a step in the right direction in defeating the FARC and regaining government control of territory in Colombia.

4. Human Rights

Human Rights has been an issue in Colombia since the initial skirmishes between the government forces and insurgents almost six decades ago.

Unlike other regions of the hemisphere, where the rights of the citizen were eroded by the excessive use of power on the part of the State, the rights of Colombian citizens have been threatened mainly by the historic inability of Colombian institutions to assert authority throughout the country and to provide citizens with continuous and reliable protection against the threat and arbitrary action of illegal armed groups.⁶³

The combat actions taken by the military against insurgent forces combined with ruthless and violent takeover of many villages by insurgent groups have forced many Colombians

⁶¹ U.S. State Department. 2002 - 2003 Report on Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Available at: www.state.gov.

⁶² Ibid., 1.

⁶³ Presidency of the Republic, “Democratic Security and Defence Policy,” Ministry of Defence. Republic of Colombia (2003), 14.

to flee their villages and there has even been spillover into the bordering countries. The United Nations estimates that there are approximately two million displaced citizens, half of whom are under the age of 18.⁶⁴ In 1996, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees established an office in Bogotá and sub regional offices in Bucaramanga, Cali, and Medellin.⁶⁵ These offices assist and advise the government on issues dealing with human rights. Under the DSP, the government has made extensive efforts to support and promote the human rights of their citizens and incorporating many suggestions from the United Nations. According to USAID, “between 2003 and 2004, the country’s human rights record improved significantly as the national homicide rate fell by 12%, trade union murders were reduced by 37%, and kidnappings fell by 42%.”⁶⁶ While impressive, the United Nations still contends “that the intertwined dynamics of the internal armed conflict, drug-trafficking, and organized crime continue to weigh heavily on the human rights situation.”⁶⁷ Even with the UN assessment, statistics show a significant decrease in the level of crime in Colombia. “The number of kidnapping victims declined to 621 in 2006, as compared to 3,572 in the record setting year of 2000.”⁶⁸

C. DEMOBILIZATION

The process of demobilization in Colombia is currently an area of contention for many, but few question its success. Between 2002 and the official end of demobilization in August 2006, approximately 32,000 paramilitary members demobilized and

⁶⁴ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, “Education for displaced Colombians,” UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/photos?set=cgi-colombia&photo=0>.

⁶⁵ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR, “Colombia 2006-2007,” OHCHR, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Pages/COSummary.aspx>.

⁶⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, “Democracy and Governance in Colombia,” (2006), 1.

⁶⁷ United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, “Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia,” Seventh Session, Agenda Item 2 (29 February 2008), 1.

⁶⁸ Harvey F. Kline, “Countries at the Crossroads 2005,” Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?ccrcountry=82&ccrpage=8&edition=2>, 9.

surrendered their weapons.⁶⁹ The demobilization of 32,000 paramilitary members is extraordinary in itself. But the problems occur because many of these “demobilizations” were a sham, in which local paramilitary groups paid local youths to “demobilize.” A second problem is that, without resources, many of these former paramilitaries continue to engage in criminal activities. A third problem is that demobilization was purchased at the price of justice and human rights.

1. Justice and Peace Law

The Justice and Peace Law of 2005 was created to assist in the demobilization and start the process of reconciliation. According to Felipe Gomez Isa, a human-rights expert, “the law aims to strike a balance between peace and justice.”⁷⁰ It provides incentives for paramilitaries to demobilize and to be reintegrated back into Colombian society. There is an ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of the program in preventing the demobilized from falling back into the hands of the groups from which they just left and how well it provides justice for the victims of these ruthless organizations.

a. Support for Justice and Peace Law

Those who support the Justice and Peace Law say that, without some sort of immunity, the AUC would never have demobilized. Opponents argue that the law lets paramilitary members off the hook practically scot-free for crimes they committed. Additionally, there is no process in place to take back the riches and land that were fraudulently or violently obtained. While some see the Justice and Peace Law as just another attempt for the government to negotiate with the terrorists organizations, some feel this process of reconciliation, combined with demobilization, is what Colombia needs to get past its six decades of internal violence. While some demobilized paramilitaries have led authorities to the sites of mass graves, many family members of victims still long to know the fate of loved ones killed by the AUC.

⁶⁹ United States Office on Colombia, USOC, “Paramilitary Demobilization,” USOC, <http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/Paramilitary%20Demobilization/>.

⁷⁰ Felipe Gomez Isa, “Paramilitary Demobilisation in Colombia: Between Peace and Justice.” Human Rights Institute at the University of Deusto (April 2008), 2.

2. Incentives

Under the DSP, the Colombian government has made extensive efforts to reintegrate the former guerrillas and paramilitaries by offering them numerous benefits such as educational, legal and psychological services, and health care.⁷¹ The reintegration process is a combined effort of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior. For demobilizing, former fighters are eligible to receive protection for themselves and their families via a safe house and a monthly stipend of 537,000 pesos (roughly \$268).⁷² Upon completing the 24-month reintegration program, “each combatant will receive a *proyecto productivo* (productive project), a lump sum payment of 8,000,000 pesos (roughly \$4,000) with which to start a small business or buy a house.”⁷³ This program gives former paramilitaries the opportunity to start a new life with money provided from the government. In addition to monetary incentives, “it offers generous benefits in terms of sentencing to paramilitaries who demobilise with the intention that this will produce positive effects for the rights to truth, reparation for victims, as well as the establishment of guarantees of non-repetition of the atrocious crimes attributed to paramilitaries (including massacres, torture, abductions).”⁷⁴

3. Effectiveness of Demobilization

The overall effectiveness of this program is debated because many argue that the Colombian government did not allocate sufficient resources to meet the needs of the demobilized paramilitaries. The demobilization of approximately 32,000 paramilitaries has been considered a success, but Human Rights Watch criticizes the process of demobilization because negotiations have provided numerous benefits to the paramilitary groups and their leaders.⁷⁵ They insisted that it would “prevent their extradition to the

⁷¹ Johnathan Morganstein, “Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons From Colombia’s Reintegration Program For Demobilized Paramilitaries,” *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 217 (November 2008), 1.

⁷² Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (1 June 2008): 527

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Isa, “Paramilitary Demobilisation in Colombia,” 2.

⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Letting Colombian Paramilitaries Off the Hook,” Report (January 2005), 1.

United States, minimize potential prison terms in Colombia, and allow them to retain as much of their illegally obtained wealth as possible.”⁷⁶ In fact, at the time of writing, former paramilitary kingpin Miguel Angel Mejia-Munera, former leader of the AUC, was extradited to the United States for violations of the provisions of the Justice and Peace Law. By 2007, “92 percent of the 30,000 paramilitaries have benefited from a de facto amnesty declared by decree. Only 8% come under the Justices and Peace Act.”⁷⁷ The current recommendation by many human rights groups is to allow the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the human rights violations.⁷⁸ The government has not allowed this course of action to occur even though its judicial system is overworked, lacking sufficient resources and in many cases corrupt because they would not be able to control the actions of the ICC. Additionally, the U.S. would be limited in what actions it could take if the ICC were involved in Colombia. In any case, the Colombian government will not be able to accommodate the recommendations of everyone and has chosen to remain confident and steadfast in the process of demobilization, which appears to be successful when considering the numbers of demobilized paramilitaries, but provides no justice to families of the victims.

D. ECONOMY

1. Effects of the Democratic Security Policy on the Colombian Economy

The insurgents and paramilitaries have taken their toll on Colombian resources because the government is forced to spend precious resources to fight these groups. According to the World Bank,

It is a fact that violence in Colombia has cost dearly, both in human terms as well as socially and economically. The economic impact of the conflict is significant: if Colombia had been in peace for the last 20 years, the per capita income of the average Colombian would be 50% higher today, and

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, “Paramilitary Demobilization in Colombia: On the Road to the International Criminal Courts,” (04 October 2007), 1.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2.

it is estimated that 2.5 million children would live above the poverty line.⁷⁹

Under the DSP, President Uribe has placed economic development high on his list of priorities, just behind security and demobilization. In 2006, significant progress was made with the drawing up of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.

a. The United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement

The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement “will eliminate tariffs and other barriers to goods and services, promote economic growth, and expand trade relations between the United States and Colombia.”⁸⁰ This agreement, though approved by the Bush administration, still has not been ratified by Congress at the time of writing. Congress is concerned about the impact a free trade agreement with Colombia could do to “U.S. living standards.”⁸¹ Others, like Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, complain that union leaders continue to be assassinated in Colombia while officials look the other way.⁸² Ratification of the United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement could be a huge economic milestone for Colombia.

b. Economic Assistance and Development

The United States-Colombia Free Trade agreement is not the only possible source of economic assistance. Between 2002-2006, the United States provided \$4 billion to Colombia under Plan Colombia.⁸³ Not only has Colombia received economic assistance from nations around the world, the DSP has had a direct effect on the economy of Colombia by increasing security. This boosted the economy, although the benefits have not been felt evenly across the social spectrum. The improved security situation has

⁷⁹ World Bank Website, “Colombia Country Brief: Developmental Progress,” World Bank Website, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/COLOMBIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:324969~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:324946,00.html>.

⁸⁰ Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Free Trade With Colombia: Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement,” (2007), 1.

⁸¹ Brookings Institute Website, “Showdown on Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” Brookings Institute Website, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0409_free_trade_agreement_blustein.aspx.

⁸² Patrick Leahy, Statement on Colombia, March 5, 2009.

⁸³ Gary Leech, “U.S. Willing to Deploy Combat Troops To Colombia,” *Colombia Journal* (May 2006): 1.

increased the “confidence in national and foreign investors,”⁸⁴ pumping a great deal of investment into the Colombian economy.

The United States continues to provide economic aid to Colombia even after the conclusion of Plan Colombia. During 2007-2008, the United States provided approximately \$1.6 billion in economic aid with nearly 80% going to the Colombia military and police forces.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ World Bank Web site, “Colombia Country Brief.”

⁸⁵ Dan Burton, comment on “Plan Colombia and Beyond, Charts: U.S. Aid Changing and Coca Staying the Same,” The Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program, comment posted online June 18, 2008, <http://www.cipcol.org/?p=422>.

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IV. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

The United States has conducted numerous SSSTR operations such as the American South following the Civil War, in Latin America and the Caribbean after 1900, Japan and Germany following World War II, in Vietnam, in Panama in Operations Just Cause, and now in Iraq and Afghanistan. The establishment of the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 made stability operations a core mission of the Department of Defense instead of a secondary mission.⁸⁶ In the past, stability operations were not considered a primary mission of the U.S. military, but mostly an ad hoc organization that was created long after combat operations had ceased, but this changed with 3000.05.

In 2005, “Cable 4045 issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), established PRTs.”⁸⁷ Since their establishment, PRTs have struggled to live up to the high expectations set forth for them.

The PRT program was established in 2005 to assist Iraq’s provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economical development and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic population needs.⁸⁸

An extremely dangerous security environment limited the initial success of the PRT. As the security environment continued to deteriorate from 2006 to 2007, the PRTs were limited to providing services in areas that were considered safe to operate. To counter this threat and still remain capable of assisting the Iraqi people, the United States created the ePRT or “embedded PRT” within a combat brigade. The ePRT was established and deployed as part of the 2007 U.S. troop surge.⁸⁹ The ePRT and PRT have been essential in reestablishing governments at the provincial level and below.

⁸⁶ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSSTR) Operations. November 28, 2005.

⁸⁷ Paul J. Salmon, “The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stability Operations: Reality and Potential” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Masters Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2008), 3.

⁸⁸ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*. SIGIR (January 2009), 186.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

This shift from U.S. support points out the United States' lack of planning concerning post-conflict stability and reconstruction, especially in an operation the size of Iraq. The timeliness of infrastructure repair and employment are only two of many issues that undermined Iraqi support for U.S. military and stability and reconstruction operations. If the United States had an existing PRT organization during the early phase of combat operations, it might not have encountered some of the reconstruction issues that it encountered such as improper funding, a lack of a clear chain of command, and being restricted to Forward Operating Bases due to the poor security environment. PRTs in Iraq were not incorporated into the stability and reconstruction phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom until 2005, which resulted in the uncoordinated activity of interagency organizations and military reconstruction efforts. Additionally, there were no PRTs that operated throughout the country to assist communities affected by combat operations outside one of the major operating hubs. Once PRTs were introduced, they had an immediate impact in reconstruction efforts. In the beginning they primarily consisted of civilians, which hindered their ability to move around the country. The military began to provide security and transportation for PRTs throughout Iraq and 10 of the PRTs were "embedded within a military brigade," known as ePRTs.⁹⁰ Once they were incorporated with military units, ePRTs were able to provide assistance and support to the population that was located in areas where security concerns remained an issue. PRT support of the population combined with military security and transportation has helped Iraqis to make extensive progress, which was less evident when U.S. military forces alone were coordinating reconstruction efforts.

A. COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

The command structure of the PRTs in Iraq have been a source of debate since their introduction in Iraq in late 2005. An April 2008 report commissioned by the House Armed Services Committee claims there still remains a significant lack of clear guidance for PRTs in Iraq. "Essentially, there are multiple chains of command: through the military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and Washington-based country

⁹⁰ U.S. Agency for International Development. "Iraq PRTs: Provincial Reconstruction Teams," (Fall 2007), 4.

representatives of the department agencies.”⁹¹ This convoluted and often confusing command structure poses a real concern for the DoD and DoS, whose personnel make up the majority of the PRTs. The counter-argument is that a solid command structure exists, but is simply misunderstood. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) claims PRTs fall under the “command of the Ambassador and the MNF-1 Commanding General.”⁹² However, this ignores a significant portion of the actual members who possess some type of authority over PRTs in Iraq. Additionally, PRTs report to a task force, regional command, and then to the U.S. Central Command, where as the civilian counterparts of the PRT report directly to their respective agencies.⁹³

The PRTs in Iraq are comprised of 50-100 civilian and military personnel depending on the area and/or mission, of various backgrounds and mission-specific talents, who work together to conduct effective stability and reconstruction operations in the provinces of Iraq (See Figure 3). Members from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, USAID, translators, and members of a U.S. Army civil affairs company are among those included in the makeup of the Iraqi PRTs.

The number and type of PRTs operating in Iraq have fluctuated since their introduction in 2005.

As of August 2008, three types of U.S.-led PRTs were operating in Iraq: 11 PRTs at the provincial level of government; 13 ePRTs embedded with U.S. brigade combat teams and operating in local governments in Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Diyala provinces; and 4 Provincial Support Teams (PST), which are smaller PRTs that cannot be based in the intended province due to security concerns.⁹⁴

⁹¹ House Armed Services Committee, *Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn From Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: April 2008), 20.

⁹² United States Agency for International Development, “Iraq PRTs: Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 2.

⁹³ GAO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,” GAO-09-86R (Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2008), 5.

⁹⁴ GAO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 2.




Figure 3. PRT Command Structure and Composition.⁹⁵

Combined with a combat brigade, ePRTs were able to conduct SSTR operations in areas that are considered insecure. The location of PRTs and ePRTs can be seen in Figure 4.

B. SECURITY

PRTs do not provide their own security and must be escorted by the U.S. military for security and transportation. According to the United States Institute of Peace, “the

⁹⁵ Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, SIGIR-06-034. (Arlington April 30, 2008).

U.S. Embassy has ruled that movement security provided by coalition partners does not meet U.S. standards. Therefore, U.S. personnel generally are unable to leave their bases unless they can make special arrangements with nearby U.S. forces.”⁹⁶ The lack of security and transportation has seriously hindered the effectiveness of the PRT prior to the surge in 2006. Following the surge, the security situation has improved and PRTs are now operating within an environment that is conducive for them to move more freely throughout the country and deliver the much needed money and assistance to the Iraqis.

1. PRT Security

The security for PRTs is normally called a Personal Security Detail (PSD), composed of both military and civilian contracted agencies depending on the location. Everything in Iraq is based on security. If the security situation deteriorates, PRTs and more specifically Foreign Service officers are not able to work with their Iraqi counterparts. In February 2007, the DoS and DoD signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where PRTs will receive U.S. military escorts when traveling throughout the Iraq.⁹⁷ This has enhanced protection of PRTs while conducting reconstruction operations. “While security restrictions do limit the opportunities to engage with Iraqis and cause frustration for FS members who need to meet with Iraqis to do their jobs, none of the FS members who spoke with Foreign Service Journal suggested the restrictions should be eased.”⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Robert M. Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.” United States Institute of Peace (Washington D.C.: March 2007), 8.

⁹⁷ Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” 50.

⁹⁸ Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map” *Foreign Service Journal* (March 2007): 31.




Figure 4. Location of PRTs and ePRTs.⁹⁹

PRTs are not willing to sacrifice their security and personal well-being to conduct reconstruction operations so they must make the most of the time they actually have in the field. The insurgency in Iraq has had a significant effect on reconstruction operations.

2. Insurgency

Stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq have been hampered by the insurgency. “The security situation places real limits on the ability of PRT personnel to promote economic development by counseling Iraqi officials, encouraging local leaders

⁹⁹ Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*.

and business owners, and motivating outside investors.”¹⁰⁰ Security for the PRTs and effectiveness go hand in hand. For example, in 2006, the security situation in Basra was extremely dangerous, which resulted in a drawdown of PRT personnel there.¹⁰¹ “With their small complement of troops and limited armaments, PRTs were extremely vulnerable, if they are not co-located with Coalition combat units.”¹⁰² Additionally, there is a debate concerning who provides protection to the PRTs when they are in the field. “Interagency dispute over whether the U.S. military would provide protection, combined with a worsening security atmosphere in much of Iraq in 2005-06 led to many PRTs being virtually paralyzed.”¹⁰³

According to Steven Groves, an expert in the War on Terrorism, “the Provincial Reconstruction Teams spread across Iraq would likely cease operations if their military components were withdrawn.”¹⁰⁴ Due to the insurgency, a heavy emphasis was placed on stability and security operations so reconstruction efforts could be conducted efficiently and in a timely manner.

3. Protecting the Population

The DSP in Colombia has placed a significant emphasis on protecting the population, especially the rural population. The PRT does not have a means to protect the Iraqi population. They rely heavily on the U.S. military for their own protection and for the protection of the members of Iraqi civil society. Even though they do not possess a direct means to protect the Iraqi population, the mere presence of combat troops has been and continues to be used as an effective tool for combating Al Qaeda-based terrorism and warring religious factions. This, however, is not in itself an antidote for defeating terrorism. In addition to U.S. troops conducting routine patrol, the Iraqi army has now

¹⁰⁰ Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” 8.

¹⁰¹ Dorman, “Iraq PRT’s,” 32.

¹⁰² Robert M. Perito, “Special Report 152: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.” *United States Institute of Peace* (Washington D.C.: October 2005): 7.

¹⁰³ Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop of PRTs, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations* (Princeton University: January 2008), 50.

¹⁰⁴ Steven Groves, “Advancing Freedom in Iraq,” *Backgrounder* 2056 (2007): 6.

been established and is taking over as the protector of the population. Unfortunately, corruption in the army and police force continue to be a problem. In 2003, the increase in violence made it difficult for the CPA to build and reintegrate Iraqi citizens back into the security force “because of poor planning, insufficient resources, and the failure to effectively counter the growing insurgency.”¹⁰⁵

C. TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS

The terrorists and insurgent organizations in Iraq have posed the most significant obstacle for PRTs operating in areas that are not secured by military forces or outside the Forward Operating Bases (FOB). Al Qaeda and Shi’a and Sunni religious factions pose the most significant threat to PRTs in Iraq. Al Qaeda attacks have increased violence between the Shi’a and Sunni in an attempt to destabilize the country have resulted in an unfavorable operational environment for PRTs to operate.

1. Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is a worldwide terrorist organization that uses extremist Islamic arguments to persuade its members that the United States in particular and the West in general, and Western values, like those of the United States, are inimicable to Islam. “(Al Qaeda) seeks to rid the Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalists Islamic regimes,” according to Jashree Bajoria.¹⁰⁶ Osama Bin Laden created Al Qaeda around 1988.¹⁰⁷ Unlike the FARC, who use illicit drug trade to fund operations against the Colombian government, “Bin Laden, member of a billionaire family that owns the Bin Ladin Group construction empire, is said to have inherited tens of millions of dollars that he uses to help finance the group. Al-Qaeda also maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable

¹⁰⁵ Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience” (Arlington: February 2, 2009), 124.

¹⁰⁶ Jashree Bajoria, “Al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-qaida, al-Qa’ida),” *Backgrounder 9126* (April 2008), 1.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

organizations.”¹⁰⁸ Al Qaeda’s command appears to be located in the Pashtun areas of South-Eastern Afghanistan and Eastern Pakistan.

2. Destabilization

The 2003 Coalition invasion destabilized Iraq by removing from power through de-Baathification the Sunni elite who had ruled Iraq since its creation in 1920. The Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Paul Bremer, dissolved the Iraqi military with CPA Order Number 2, 23 May 2003, based on the assumption that the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi police would be able to establish and maintain security and throughout the country while the military was re-established with “Western concepts of accountability and rule of law.”¹⁰⁹ The disestablishment of the military inadvertently ignited further violence by throwing a military force of approximately 375,000 members¹¹⁰ on the street, minus approximately 40,000 who were retained to provide external defense. There were no programs developed to deal with the large number of demobilized military members, and no training or initiatives to maintain a living for their families and for themselves. The demobilization of approximately 310,000 Iraqi soldiers, without pay, was a gift to the insurgency.

3. Incentives

There are very few incentives for insurgents to demobilize in Iraq, since they are fighting under a so-called “jihad” against American forces. Many of the insurgents in Iraq are only there to conduct operations against American forces and originate from other countries. The only real incentive for insurgents to demobilize is to avoid death by American or reconstituted Iraqi forces. Demobilization therefore, is likely to be a slow process directly linked to the provisions of security and economic stability.

¹⁰⁸ Global Security, “Al-Qaida/Al-Qaeda,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>.

¹⁰⁹ Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience,” 124.

¹¹⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Military Capability: Fighting A Wounded, But Dangerous, Poisonous Snake.” Center For Strategic and International Studies. December 3, 2001. http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/csis-iraq_milcap-120301.pdf.

D. ECONOMY

1. Iraq's Economy

Iraq possesses an oil-based economy that is capable of sustaining its needs as a country and to continue SSTR operations without the financial aid of the United States. The United States has pumped billions of dollars into the economy of Iraq since 2003. Initially, U.S. funding was needed to repair critical infrastructure and get the country back on its feet. Nearly seven years later, the U.S. is still pouring money into a country that as of 2008 possesses a projected surplus of \$86 billion in oil revenue.¹¹¹ Though this is not directly related to PRT funding, some of the money spent by PRTs in the reconstruction of Iraq has been and should continue to come from Iraqi funds.

2. Economic Aid From the United States

The United States has been the major source of funding for stability and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. There are other coalition partners working in the region and providing economic assistance. However, many countries refused to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq due to the unilateral approach taken by the United States during the invasion of Iraq. Between the years of 2005-2008 the U.S. has expended approximately \$32 billion in stability and reconstruction efforts.¹¹² "International donors have pledged about \$14.9 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction."¹¹³ In addition to the enormous amount of funding provided directly to the reconstruction of Iraq, the U.S. also provided "\$1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq."¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ GAO, "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenue, Expenditures, and Surplus," GAO-08-1144T (Washington D.C.: September 16, 2008), 1.

¹¹² Embassy of the United States, "Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)." (17 December 2007), 1.

¹¹³ GAO, "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donors," 12.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., x.

a. PRT Funding

The United States has spent a significant amount of money on stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. PRTs possess a large number of funding sources to support projects to include: USAID, State Department, Commander Emergency Response Program Funding (CERP), and various other donors. Money provided from the PRTs is essential in keeping the civilian population employed and providing funds needed for reconstruction. Every aspect of stability and reconstruction depends on funding provided from PRTs. According to Cooling and Gropman, “men, material, and finances may be most important for stability and reconstruction operations.”¹¹⁵

b. Commanders Emergency Response Funding and Quick Reaction Funding

The bulk of the funding for PRTs is provided from the Commanders Emergency Response Fund largely because a streamlined process to receive funding makes it relatively red-tape free. Funding has proven to be a major issue for PRTs since their establishment in Iraq especially for PRT members from the Department of State. In order to alleviate this problem and release funding to its officers, the DoS created “Quick Reaction Funding.”¹¹⁶ The QRF provides funding for PRT projects that cost less than \$25,000.¹¹⁷ “QRF funding for projects greater than \$25,000 becomes mired in bureaucracy and often takes months for approval.”¹¹⁸ Even with the changes to the distribution of PRT funding, “uncertainty over future funding amounts limited their ability to commit to long-term reconstruction projects.”¹¹⁹ Funding will continue to be a source of concern for PRTs in future operations.

¹¹⁵ B.F. Cooling and Alan Gropman, “Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: A Historical Perspective,” in *Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Past, Present, and Future* (Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Symposium: March 23, 2006), 11.

¹¹⁶ House Armed Services Committee, *Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn From Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: April 2008), 22.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 71

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ House Armed Services Committee, *Agency Stovepipes*, 71.

c. NGO Coordination

In addition, to issues with funding and the insurgency, the lack of interagency coordination in Iraq has hamstrung some PRT guided reconstruction efforts. Duplication of projects has resulted from the refusal of certain aid organizations to work with or even communicate with military forces, which has benefited neither. Due to the extensive damage inflicted on the Iraqi infrastructure and population, billions of U.S. dollars have been used in an effort to rebuild the country. Currently, the United States has allocated \$830.2 billion to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹²⁰ Only recently has Iraq begun to tap into its \$86 billion oil surplus revenues to pay for infrastructure projects.¹²¹ If stability can be achieved, Iraq should have the resources to maintain its economy and continue the reconstruction process while still receiving minimal aid from outside agencies.

¹²⁰ National Priorities Project, “Cost of War,” National Priorities Project.
http://www.nationalpriorities.org/costofwar_home.

¹²¹ GAO, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenue, Expenditures, and Surplus,” 1.

V. CONCLUSION

President Uribe's DSP in Colombia has brought numerous benefits to a country that has been plagued by insurgent and paramilitary violence, lack of government control and weak democratic institutions. In 2002, when President Uribe took office, many believed that Colombia was perilously close to becoming a failed state.

The PRT was imported into Iraq from Afghanistan in 2005 in order "to assist Iraq's provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economical development and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic population needs."¹²²

The Colombians have evolved their methods during the struggle against insurgents and paramilitaries since the 1980s. The United States has had time to utilize lessons learned from numerous SSTR operations, but continues to falter from a lack of coordinated, in depth planning prior to combat operations or anticipated SSTR operations. When analyzing the DSP and PRT, both possess elements that would be beneficial if incorporated into the other. Even with this in mind, one must understand that the DSP and PRTs are operating in two completely different SSTR environments.

The most important factor that would have the largest impact on reconstruction efforts conducted by PRTs is identifying a clear chain of command. Many of the efforts to conduct reconstruction operations in Iraq were hampered by confusing and convoluted chains of command. Additionally, the U.S. should reach back in time to their pacification efforts in Vietnam and revive or institute a program similar to that of Combined Action Program (CAP). Colombia has utilized a similar program, the *soldados de mi pueblo* in order to try and protect its population against insurgent violence.

The element of *soldados de mi pueblo*, or Home Guard, is a technique used in Colombia wherein villagers are used as a type of militia that is empowered to protect the village from insurgent activity and provide intelligence concerning insurgent activity to

¹²² Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 186.

the CNP and the Colombian military. This program could be used in Iraq in order to provide protection to the villages, where the U.S. military cannot routinely operate. The creation of the *soldados de mi pueblo* in Iraq, like Colombia, would be a short-term approach to a long-term problem. Maintaining these groups could have a detrimental effect if they coalesce into one large, armed militia group like the AUC. However, this is a short-term effort that would provide additional security while stability and reconstruction operations were ongoing. Another option that would be useful to the PRT is the Combined Action Program that was successfully used in Vietnam (CAP).

The CAP program placed small contingents of Marines in the villages and hamlets to provide protection and build trust with the Vietnamese. Currently the PRTs are mission restricted if the security situation deteriorates. The PRTs should move off the Forward Operating Bases and into villages and towns, where they can build trust with the villagers and have a firm grip on reality in their operational areas. It is difficult to build a relationship with the Iraqi people when PRTs disappear during deteriorating security situations. Living in the villages and towns would also allow the PRT to act as an element of security for the population as opposed to relying solely on the security and protection of the U.S. military. The risk of placing PRTs or elements of PRTs in villages and towns is the fear that the village might be infiltrated by insurgents and the U.S. could be unknowingly operating and cooperating with insurgents. The same fears were present in the CORDS program in Vietnam.

Operating in an environment that is being attacked by an active insurgency does not mean that reconstruction operations must cease. The creation of the ePRT is a step in the right direction for conducting SSTR operations in an insecure environment. The ePRT is a PRT that has been incorporated into a combat brigade, which allows the PRT to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in areas where security issues remain. Security is a major concern in stability and reconstruction operations. “The first element to plan for is security, without which there will never be successful nation building.”¹²³

¹²³ B.F. Cooling and Alan Gropman, “Resourcing Stability Operations and Reconstruction,” 28.

This holds true in most SSTR operations. Colombia is no exception. Until Colombia can effectively defeat the FARC, complete government control of Colombia will remain out of reach.

The controversial Justice and Peace Law in Colombia is supposed to allow paramilitary members to confess their atrocities in return for special treatment by the Colombian government. Many human rights groups argue that the law is too flexible and allows too many rewards for the ex-paramilitaries and too few for the victims' families. The government should aggressively prosecute members who have committed atrocities in the past, and if their judicial system is unable to hear the case in a timely manner, they should be more proactive in extraditing high-profile criminals who might otherwise escape prosecution through paramilitary infiltration of the government.

The DSP and PRTs have made significant strides in trying to establish government rule, reclaim territory, protect the population, and promote economic development. The DSP has targeted the insurgent groups in Colombia, sometimes being accused of abusing human rights. Even with these accusations, according to USAID, "between 2003 and 2004, the country's human rights record improved significantly as the national homicide rate fell by 12%, trade union murders were reduced by 37%, and kidnappings fell by 42%."¹²⁴ These results might be impressive, but they are just beginning in a long fight against the insurgents.

The most significant progress made by the PRTs is realizing the importance of security and the need for funding procedures. PRTs in Iraq were not able to conduct reconstruction operations in many instances due to the security environment. In future operations, the hope is that one will look back at the lessons learned during the PRTs' time in Iraq and not make the same mistake. Secondly, the establishment of QRF by the DoS made the disbursement of funding to PRTs more efficient. This quick ability to receive funding led to the many successful reconstruction efforts.

There is no "correct" formula to conduct SSTR operations, but there are techniques and can be used that can significantly affect the people and environment in which the operation is being conducted. Planning, security, and funding can never be overlooked. It

¹²⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Democracy and Governance in Colombia," 1.

is the preparation made prior that will determine the success or failure in an SSTR environment. Overall the DSP has been more successful in SSTR operations and in combating insurgents, reclaiming territory, establishing government control, and protecting the population. Since the Colombians are operating as an internal entity, they fighting for the country in which they live, where the PRTs in Iraq are an external entity that will eventually leave, leaving all operations to the Iraqis. Additionally, de-Baathification, combined with the newly acquired power of the Shi'a, is dividing the population as opposed to uniting the separate factions within Iraq.

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